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Introduction 
 
1. I am the Director of the Centre for Parliament and Public Law and a Senior Lecturer 
in Law at the University of Winchester. I have previously taught Public Law at the 
University of Manchester and King's College London. I hold a PhD in Constitutional 
Law from the University of Manchester. 
 
2. The call for evidence asked for written evidence on the following three questions 
relating to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 ('the Act’): 
 
• (1) What status do motions of no confidence have if they do not conform to the terms 
of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011? 
• (2) What relationship might such motions have to a motion under the Act calling for 
a General Election? 
• (3) What implications does this have for our understanding of the Act, its 
effectiveness and how it works? 
 
3. My evidence addresses questions 1 and 2 together and concludes by answering 
question 3 with more general comments about the Act and its possible replacement. 
 
4. In summary, my conclusion is that an early general election under the terms of the Act 
is the most likely consequence of a successful no confidence motion that does not 
conform to the Act. Fundamentally, politics will prevail over any difficulties created by 
the Act. However, there is a genuine question over whether the Prime Minister is under 
a requirement to resign, and this may have implications for when motions under the 
Act calling for a general election can be moved. If the Prime Minister is required to 
resign immediately following a no confidence vote, then the Act has the potential to 
cause significant problems. Principally, these problems can be avoided if the situation 
is clarified so that the Prime Minister only becomes under a duty to resign when there 
is a viable, alternative government. 
 
  
(A) THE EFFECT OF THE ACT 
 
5. A no confidence motion of whatever form, that does not conform with the Act, does 
not, by itself, trigger a general election. Only the following two motions can trigger an 
early general election:  
 
• s 2 (3)-(5): ‘That this House has lost confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’, and 
within the following fourteen days, the House of Commons does not pass the motion, 
‘That this House has confidence in Her Majesty’s Government’. 
 
• s 2 (1)-(2): If 66% of MPs vote in favour of the motion, ‘That there shall be an early 
parliamentary general election’  (‘the 66% method’). 
 
6. This means that a general election is not immediately triggered following a 
government defeat on either on a motion of confidence worded differently to that 
specified in the Act, or on a vote the government has decided to treat as a matter of 
confidence.  The response to any defeat, or a series of defeats that call into question 
the viability of the government, is likely to be that either of the two methods provided 
by the Act will be used to hold an early general election. 
 
7. However, the Act raises one important question, namely whether the Prime Minister 
is required to resign following a vote of no confidence? To answer this question, the 
old rules, the effect of the Act, and then how the Act operates following a successful 
vote of no confidence all need to be considered. 
 
The Old Rules 
8. The sole purpose of the Act is to regulate the timing of general elections while making 
provision for early general elections if needed. The concern is that the rules that 
regulate the timing of general elections are also intimately connected with the issue of 
government formation. This means that other considerations need to be taken into 
account. These include: 
 (a) the basic requirement that the Queen must not be left without a government,1 
(b) the authority to govern is dependent on enjoying the confidence of the House of 
Commons;2 
(c) Historically, the Monarch had the reserve power to dismiss the government, but 
today should not be drawn into making an active political decision. It is the 
responsibility of the political parties to resolve any doubt as to who should form the 
next government.3 
 
9. The pre-Act rules ensured that these considerations were always fulfilled. If the 
government loses a vote of no confidence, the Prime Minister can either resign on 
behalf of the government or seek an early general election.4 There has been some 
doubt over whether this was the position;5 however, it is drawn from the precedents. 
In 1979, when James Callaghan lost a vote of no confidence, he immediately sought 
a general election. In 1924, following a defeat on a vote of no confidence, the Prime 
Minister, Ramsay McDonald was granted a dissolution of Parliament by George V. 
Both Callaghan and Ramsay resigned once defeated at the following general election. 
The last Prime Minister to resign following a no confidence defeat was Stanley Baldwin 
in 1924, who had exercised his right to meet the new Parliament following the general 
election in 1923, which saw the Conservative government lose their majority.6 
                                                 
 10. These precedents also show that the Prime Minister remained in office following a no 
confidence vote until it was clear that someone else was able to command the 
confidence of the Commons, following the general election result. This is also 
consistent with how, when standing down as party leader, prime ministers only resign 
following the conclusion of their party’s leadership election. 
 
When does the Prime Minister come under an obligation to resign? 
11. The Act has placed into doubt the operation of the pre-existing conventions regarding 
the resignation of the Prime Minister. This ambiguity applies to all no confidence 
motions, not just those that are not covered by the Act. There are two main possibilities 
- either to resign immediately following the defeat, or when there is an alternative 
government. The argument that the Prime Minister should resign immediately is 
simple; the Act has removed the ability to call a general election, meaning that an 
immediate resignation is the Prime Minister’s only option.  
 
Arguments Against Immediate Resignation 
12. The argument that the Prime Minister must immediately resign potentially 
misunderstands the relationship between statute and convention. Simply stated, the 
purpose of the Act is to regulate when general elections are held. The Act achieves 
this purpose by introducing new legal rules, which preclude the operation of any 
existing non-legal rules such as conventions because it has become illegal to follow 
any convention that contravenes the new legal rules. However, if an Act abolishes 
only certain conventions, then other, related, conventions remain to the extent that 
they do not conflict with the statute in question. In this context, the Prime Minister can 
no longer ‘call’ an early general election as the Act has removed this power. On the 
face it, it may appear that this simply leaves the convention of the Prime Minister’s 
immediate resignation. 
 
13. However, the other consideration is that the conventions that remain following 
statutory intervention may need to change in order to take account of the new legal 
rules introduced by statute. Although the government’s intention was otherwise,7 the 
                                                 
Act may have indirectly changed the convention of the Prime Minister’s resignation.8 
Not only is this consistent with the nature of constitutional conventions themselves 
which are inherently capable of changing, but it is also consistent with the broader 
constitutional context that gives rise to their very existence in the first place. The 
Jennings’ test for the existence of a constitutional convention includes considering 
whether there is a good reason for the rule.9 This means that if the reasons for a 
convention to exist differ because of a new legal and constitutional context, then it 
follows that the convention may need to change to take account of the new rules. 
 
14. The following considers that the Act, in removing the ability of the Prime Minister to 
‘call’ a general election has had the effect of clarifying when the Prime Minister is 
under an obligation to resign, which is when an alternative government can be found.10 
The constitutional ‘reason’ is that this formulation of the convention is flexible enough 
to ensure that a Prime Minister does not unjustifiably cling onto office while ensuring 
that there is always a government.11 As explained below, it also creates little room any 
manipulation of the rules provided by the Act and has the benefit of simplicity as it 
applies to no confidence motions that do or do not comply with section 2(3) of the Act. 
It is also consistent with the approach following a general election that results in a 
hung parliament.12 The one exception are votes that the Prime Minister has made an 
issue of their own personal authority, although as discussed below, that would result 
in a Prime Minister resigning in their own right, rather than on behalf of the 
government. 
 
15. The other ‘reason’ in favour of this approach is that the option of the Prime Minister’s 
immediate resignation under the old rules arose because the alternative was to seek 
                                                 
a dissolution of Parliament. A Prime Minister would have acted entirely 
unconstitutionally if they did not call an election or resigned, but instead continued as 
if nothing had happened following a loss of confidence. By removing one of the two 
options, the Act has changed the operation of the one remaining option. 
 
No Confidence Votes Under the Act 
16. If the House of Commons passes the motion, ‘That this House has no confidence in 
Her Majesty’s Government’,13 then there are fourteen days within which the House of 
Commons must pass the motion, ‘That this House has confidence in her Majesty’s 
Government’, 14  otherwise a general election will be held. 15  The Act is entirely 
ambiguous as to what should happen within that fourteen-day period. However, as the 
Cabinet Manual describes, the government ‘can seek to regain the confidence of the 
House’ during this period,16 presumably through conducting negotiations with other 
parties.17 It follows from this that the Prime Minister is under no immediate duty to 
resign and indeed could wait for the fourteen-day period to end if attempts to regain 
the confidence of the House failed. In addition, as the Cabinet Manual states, the 
Prime Minister is ‘expected to resign where it is clear that he or she does not have the 
confidence of the House of Commons and that an alternative government does have 
the confidence’.18 If the opposition parties had agreed to form a government, then the 
Prime Minister would have to resign. All together this approach would be partly 
analogous to the position before the Act, albeit subject to the fourteen-day period. 
 
17. In addition, if the main parties agree, there appears to be no obstacle to using the 66% 
method to dispense with the fourteen-day period (or what remains of it) and hold a 
general election more immediately. 19  During the fourteen-day period, and any 
                                                 
following general election campaign, the government would remain in office, subject 
to the usual caretaker rules. 
 
18. If it was otherwise, with the Prime Minister being required to resign immediately - 
because the old rules were left unaffected by the Act - then in theory, the provisions 
of the Act could be gamed or manipulated. The Monarch would be required to appoint 
the Leader of the Opposition as Prime Minister, who, depending on the results of the 
last election, could be considerably short of a majority and lack the ability to call a 
general election in the way that Harold Wilson did in 1974, when he led a minority 
Labour government to call the October election.20 Whether a general election would 
be held would be dependent on the Opposition, and how they voted on the 
government on the motion ‘That this House has confidence in Her Majesty’s 
Government’ or any proposal by the new government to hold an immediate election 
under the 66% method. The Opposition parties, particularly the party that had just left 
office, could seek to re-group in opposition,21 moving a motion of no confidence as 
required by the Act to start the fourteen-day period at a time of their choosing. 
Theoretically, the new government could be forced to remain in office for the 
remainder of the Parliament, unable to get its legislation through or govern effectively. 
This, second, government could even resign in office, leaving the monarch no 
alternative other than appointing the leader of the party that was first appointed into 
government at the start of the Parliament. 
 
19. It would be expected that the 66% method would be used to resolve any such situation 
with an early general election. However, this analysis highlights the theoretical 
difficulties that could emerge if the structure of the Act was combined with a duty on 
the Prime Minister to resign immediately. More realistically, an immediate resignation 
is likely only to be another step towards an inevitable general election. Overall, unless 
a viable alternative government emerges, it is difficult to see the benefits of requiring 
an immediate resignation, as opposed to allowing the Prime Minister to remain in 
office until the end of the fourteen-day period and to contest the early general election. 
 
No Confidence Motions Outside the Act 
                                                 
20. If the analysis outlined above is accepted as regards no confidence motions under the 
Act, then it also applies to no confidence motions outside of the Act. Generally, it is 
difficult to see why a Leader of the Opposition would wish to move a vote of no 
confidence that did not comply with the Act. The Prime Minister could interpret any 
failure to move a motion that complied with the Act as an indication that they did not 
want to contest an election, meaning that the Leader of the Opposition did not view 
themselves as an alternative Prime Minister. The Prime Minister could advance the 
argument that in the interest of maintaining a government, they should remain in office. 
Indeed, the Prime Minister could call the Leader of the Opposition’s bluff by seeking 
to hold an early general election via the 66% method as provided by the Act. Politically, 
it would be odd for the Leader of the Opposition to call a vote of no confidence, 
succeed, but then prevent a general election and denying themselves the chance of 
gaining a majority and entering government themselves. 
 
21. If the Prime Minister was required to resign immediately, with the Leader of the 
Opposition appointed in their place, then the difficulties described in paragraph 18 
also apply in these circumstances. For any new government, there is the additional 
difficulty, that because the provisions of the Act are not engaged there would be no 
general election by default at the end of the fourteen-day period. 
 
No Confidence Motions Outside the Act - Matters Treated As Confidence Motions 
22. Fundamentally, confidence motions test whether the government continues to have 
the confidence of the Commons. It has always been open to the government to make 
a particular vote a matter of confidence. Prime Ministers have used this as a method 
to secure the support of recalcitrant backbenchers. The threat was that if the vote were 
lost, they would call a general election and their seats could be at risk.22 
 
23. The Act does not preclude a Prime Minister from doing this, but now it no longer 
contains the threat of a general election as that is no longer in their gift.23 However, 
the question as to whether the Prime Minister must resign remains. Should a Prime 
Minister resign immediately, without a viable alternative government, then the 
                                                 
problems described in paragraph 18 would apply to any government led by the Leader 
of the Opposition. Given these difficulties, if it is accepted that the Prime Minister 
should resign only if there is an alternative government, the removal of the power to 
call a general election makes it constitutionally questionable for the Prime Minister to 
float the possibility of their resignation if there is no viable alternative government. This 
risks breaching the convention that the Monarch is not left without a government, and 
requiring them to make an active choice. 
 
24. The obvious alternative is that the Prime Minister could promise that, if they are 
defeated on any specific vote, they will seek an election under either of the procedures 
allowed by the Act. The difficulty is that it is entirely possible for backbench MPs to 
vote against their government on a crucial vote, but with their government on any 
confidence motion that complied with the Act to trigger the fourteen-day period, or 
against an early general election via the 66% method. 
 
25. Given that backbench MPs could still support the government on any vote of 
confidence, the Prime Minister could choose to make a particular vote a matter about 
the support for their leadership personally, making the political promise that if they 
lose a particular vote, they will resign as Prime Minister and trigger a party leadership 
contest. This would not be a confidence motion in any traditional sense. This does not 
threaten the position of backbench MPs in the same way but may encourage some to 
vote with the government and their Prime Minister. The effect of any such threats 
appears weak, as this does not create an opportunity for the Opposition to take office. 
Indeed, if the relationship between backbench MPs and the Prime Minister becomes 
so strained, then some backbench MPs may view such a vote as a mechanism to 
circumvent their internal party leadership rules and quickly remove a Prime Minister 
and party leader.24  
 
26. In turn, this shows how the Act has fostered a different dynamic between the Prime 
Minister and their backbench MPs, particularly during the present period of minority 
                                                 
government. Before the Act, backbench MPs (especially those in marginal 
constituencies) needed to support the Prime Minister on votes of confidence in order 
to remain an MP. Now, under the Act, the Prime Minister requires the continuing 
support of their own backbenchers to be able to govern, as they can block government 
legislation knowing that in practice an early general election can only be held with their 
agreement. 
 
Other Votes 
27. Ultimately, the same analysis applies to votes on the budget and the Queen’s Speech 
- to the extent that they are votes of confidence. This has been the matter of some 
debate, with the House of Commons Library describing the categorisation of these 
votes as confidence motions as ‘speculative’.25 This is because a confidence motion 
directly tests the confidence of the House, which the Queen’s Speech or the Finance 
Bill do not. However, a government may choose to resign following a serious defeat 
or a series of defeats,26 but similar problems arise as to the alternative government as 
when a Prime Minister was under a requirement to resign following a vote of no 
confidence because the Act provides an obstacle to an early general election. 
 
(3) What implications does this have for our understanding of the Act, its 
effectiveness and how it works? 
 
28. The Act has operated as intended and the theoretical problems highlighted above 
have yet to occur in practice. In 2015, It served its purpose for the coalition 
government, as Parliament was dissolved following the expiry of the five-year fixed 
period. The Act worked as intended in 2017 when Theresa May announced that she 
intended to hold a general election and the House of Commons voted for one via the 
66% method. May was reasonably confident of Labour’s response as Jeremy Corbyn 
had already stated that Labour would vote for an early general election if a vote were 
called.27 The political reality could be that if a Prime Minister proposes to hold a 
                                                 
general election, then the opposition parties may find it difficult to prevent it. This may 
mean that the theoretical problems continue to remain matters of theoretical interest 
only.28 
 
29. The structure of the Act, with Parliament being dissolved automatically after the five-
year period unless an ‘early’ general election is held may make a five-year term the 
norm, rather than Prime Ministers with working majorities seeking a general election 
around four years into a term.29 That definitive endpoint can make people accustomed 
to the idea that Parliament lasts five years, which is helpful for planning both within 
government departments and in Parliament.30 In this context, it may seem odd for a 
government with a healthy majority to voluntarily seek an early general election.  
 
30. However, politics does not always work according to such rhythms. Indeed, whatever 
happened as regards Brexit, David Cameron had indicated that he did not want to 
seek a third term as Prime Minister, and at some point would have stepped down 
during the 2015-2020 Parliament.31 A new Prime Minister may well have wanted to 
have sought their own mandate which could only be acquired by an early general 
election. Particularly towards the end of the parliamentary term, the opposition parties 
are less likely to block an early election.  
 
31. Yet, it remains the case that the Act is inferior to the old rules it replaced. The vase 
has been broken, and it is difficult to put it back together. There are doubts about 
whether this could be achieved by merely repealing the Act, although the repealing 
statute could revive the old rules.32 However, it might be thought to be odd to return 
to a system that could allow a hereditary monarch to prevent a general election. One 
                                                 
benefit of the Act is that by placing the power to dissolve Parliament in the hands of 
Parliament itself, away from the government, it better reflected the separation of 
powers.33  
 
32. An alternative would be to allow the Prime Minister to call an election subject to the 
approval of a vote of the House of Commons. 34  Following the approval of the 
Commons, the Prime Minister could seek the dissolution from the Monarch who would 
have no ability to refuse.35 Clearly, a majority government could hold an election 
whenever they wished, but arguably this is already the case under the Act. The benefit 
is that it would greatly simplify the situation with minority governments by making it 
easier to hold an election. The dynamic would, as was the case in 2017, be towards 
a Commons vote in favour of an early election. On the Prime Minister’s initiative, 
Opposition parties would find it difficult to avoid an early general election, particularly 
if they have just defeated the government on a vote of no confidence.36 Requiring the 
consent of the House of Commons would also prevent a Prime Minister who had just 
lost their majority at an election from immediately seeking another election if an 
alternative government is available. 
                                                 
